MARGARET BENEFIEL

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS OR NATURAL PARTNERS?

The Academic Study of Spirituality and Business

1. INTRODUCTION

At first glance, spirituality and business appear to be strange bedfellows. After all, business honors profits while spirituality honors prophets. In the academic realm, the study of business and management takes a social scientific perspective, while the study of spirituality takes a philosophical and theological perspective. Spirituality and business appear to be at odds in both the practical and the academic realms and their relationship deserves deeper

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1 This talk is a further development of part of an article which originally appeared in The Leadership Quarterly 16 (2005), 723-727, ‘The second half of the journey: Spiritual leadership for organizational transformation.’ It is also a version of an article which appeared in Studies in Spirituality 16 (December 2006), 273-285, ‘Strange Bedfellows or Natural Partners? The Academic Study of Spirituality and Business.’
probing on both fronts. In this talk, I seek to explore the academic realm.

In the business and management literature, a growing chorus of scholarly voices is arguing that spirituality is necessary in organizations – for ethical behavior, for job satisfaction and employee commitment, and for productivity and competitive advantage. Increasingly, this point is being demonstrated and empirical studies designed to test this hypothesis further are being conceived and implemented even as we speak.

This is important work which needs to be done, especially to help those who work in the new academic field of spirituality at work (SAW) to be in dialogue with mainstream management scholars. These SAW scholars are making good progress and are helping to establish the viability and rigor of this new field. At the same time,

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important issues are going unaddressed in the management scholarship on spirituality in organizations.

2. THE ISSUES

Most SAW studies appear in the business and management literature. Most empirical studies in the SAW field have been quantitative studies. For example, David Trott discovered high correlation between spiritual well-being and organizational openness, self-efficacy, and organizational commitment. Hamilton Beazley developed an instrument to measure individual spirituality. He discovered a correlation between a high level of spirituality and honesty, humility, and service to others. Donde Ashmos and Dennis Duchon constructed a definition of spirituality in the workplace which, their study found, is valid at the

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4 D. Trott, Spiritual well-being of workers: An exploratory study of spirituality in the workplace. (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1996.)

individual level. Testing Ashmos and Duchon’s construct further, Milliman, Czaplewski, and Ferguson found that there is a positive correlation between workplace spirituality and such employee attitudes as commitment to the organization, intrinsic work satisfaction, and job involvement.

Those who do this quantitative research argue for its necessity, relying on ‘the dispassionate objectivism afforded by the scientific method’. At the same time, others argue that such studies are not only insufficient for the subject at hand, but may actually be counterproductive, noting that where spirituality is ‘harnessed for secular outcomes such as profit, the desired benefits may not be as expected’. Scholars also question whether conventional social science as it is now constituted can even adequately measure spirituality, noting the absurdity of ‘trying to factor analyze

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This debate seems to have reached an impasse. The two camps speak different languages and, more often than not, talk past one another. Many of the discussions seem to generate more heat than light.

In order to analyze the issues at stake here, I will make several moves in this talk. I’ll first elucidate the current debate between quantitative researchers and their critics by situating it within the paradigms articulated by Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan in *Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis.* Then I’ll propose a further refinement of Burrell and Morgan’s work by drawing on the work of Bernard Lonergan, demonstrating how his work bridges the chasm between the two camps. I’ll then point out the current ‘flatland’ state of the social sciences, drawing on Richard Bernstein, Jurgen Habermas, Charles

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Taylor, and Alan Wallace,\textsuperscript{14} who all address the limitations of contemporary social science which focuses solely on ‘what is’. I’ll then use the work of Daniel Helminiak, who extends Lonergan’s work to the social sciences,\textsuperscript{15} to propose a solution to the dilemma at hand, showing how spirituality and the social sciences can live together harmoniously and complement one another in the spirituality at work conversation.

3. BURRELL AND MORGAN, LONERGAN

3.1. Burrell and Morgan’s paradigms

Burrell and Morgan outline four paradigms within which, they claim, all approaches to organizational analysis can be categorized. In Burrell and Morgan’s terminology, the foregoing quantitative research fits within the ‘functionalist’ paradigm. As Burrell and Morgan point out, by far the most


research in organizational studies falls within their functionalist paradigm, thus establishing it as the dominant paradigm. As a result, the other three paradigms ‘have adopted a reactive stance with regard to the functionalist orthodoxy. [...] They have often been drawn into critique on the functionalists’ ground, thus giving an impression of their satellite-like status’.16

Burrell and Morgan seek to shed light on this debate by digging deeper and exposing the philosophical roots of the differences among the four paradigms, thus enabling each paradigm to stand on its own terms, instead of appearing as one orthodox paradigm with three satellite paradigms orbiting it.

They begin their project by delineating philosophical influences which have contributed to assumptions about the nature of social science. The philosophical division most significant for the social sciences, they claim, is the division between subjective and objective philosophical positions. They examine various philosophical streams, especially the two major intellectual traditions of ‘sociological positivism’ and ‘German idealism’, pointing out the objective character

16 Burrell & Morgan, Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis, 396.
of the former and the subjective character of the latter. Sociological positivism, they explain, ‘reflects the attempt to apply models and methods derived from the natural sciences to the study of human affairs’.\textsuperscript{17} German idealism, on the other hand, takes the opposite approach: it believes that ‘the ultimate reality of the universe lies in “spirit” or “idea” rather than in the data of sense perception’.\textsuperscript{18} These two philosophical positions result in opposing views of ontology, human nature, epistemology, and methodology in the social sciences.

They then move to an examination of sociological assumptions about the nature of society, claiming that the ‘sociology of regulation’ stands in opposition to the ‘sociology of radical change’.

**Burrell and Morgan’s Paradigms**

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\textsuperscript{17} Idem, 7.  
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<th>Paradigm</th>
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With the two philosophical stances and the two theories of society articulated, Burrell and Morgan are ready to present their four paradigms of organizational analysis. The ‘functionalist’ paradigm approaches its subject from an objectivist point of view and is rooted in the sociology of regulation. The ‘interpretive’ paradigm, also rooted in the sociology of regulation, approaches its subject from a subjectivist point of view. The ‘radical humanist’ paradigm approaches its subject from a subjectivist point of view and is rooted in the sociology of radical change. The ‘radical structuralist’ paradigm approaches its subject from...
an objectivist point of view and is also rooted in the sociology of radical change.22

As noted above, Burrell and Morgan point out the dominance of the functionalist paradigm in organizational studies. They also point to the rise of the interpretive paradigm since the mid-1960’s, with the development of ethnomethodological approaches and phenomenological approaches to the study of organizations. In Burrell and Morgan’s terms, most of the debate outlined at the beginning of this talk is a debate between the functionalist paradigm and the interpretive paradigm, with the interpretive paradigm struggling to assert itself against the functionalist orthodoxy, struggling to move out of ‘satellite’ status. Burrell and Morgan’s work demonstrates that these two paradigms do indeed speak two different languages, stemming from their different worldviews. It comes as no surprise, then, that they often seem to be talking past one another. Burrell and Morgan believe that their four paradigms are mutually exclusive: ‘They offer alternative views of social reality, and to understand the nature of all four is to understand four different views of society. [...] A

22 Idem, 33.
synthesis is not possible, since in their pure forms they are contradictory'.

Burrell and Morgan have done a masterful job of pointing out the philosophical roots of the divide between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. They have demonstrated that each of the philosophical positions underlying a paradigm contains strong arguments and has many adherents. They have thus presented a compelling argument for respecting each paradigm on its own terms. This is an important achievement, as it helps move the field of organizational studies away from the functionalist orthodoxy and toward a richer, more multifaceted methodology. At the same time, Burrell and Morgan still leave us with the unbridgable chasm between the different paradigms. Is there no hope of the two camps delineated at the beginning of this article ever learning to talk to one another, let alone achieving a synthesis?

The most fundamental distinction between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms is the subjective-objective split. In an interview with Albert Mills subsequent

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23 Idem, 25.
to the publication of the book, Morgan stated: ‘I think that everyone is always looking for some sort of synthesis, and I guess that the paradigms will be negated by future theories that may actually transcend that subject-object relationship. It was our judgement that no one has ever done that’.24

Morgan is correct in that no one in the field of organizational studies has transcended the subjective-objective split. However, there is a philosopher who has transcended that divide, and his work can be brought to bear on organizational studies.

3.2. Lonergan: bridging the divide

The philosopher/methodologist Bernard Lonergan addresses and moves beyond the subject-object split in a way that can be helpful to organizational studies. Lonergan explodes the common assumption that subjectivity and objectivity are mutually exclusive.

Lonergan focuses on the structures of human knowing through what he terms ‘the operations of consciousness’. These operations consist of experiencing, understanding,

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24 Interview Morgan (n.d.)
judging, and deciding. Humans come to know what they know and do what they do by exercising these operations of consciousness. Lonergan builds his understanding of human knowing by beginning with his audience, asking them to start with their own experiences and verify the operations of consciousness within themselves. Then, rather than separating subjectivity and objectivity Lonergan demonstrates how the two are related. Authentic subjectivity, for Lonergan, involves heeding the inherent norms in the structure of consciousness, which correspond to each of the operations of consciousness, as delineated below:

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<th>Operations of consciousness</th>
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<td>Be attentive</td>
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<td>Be intelligent</td>
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<td>Be reasonable</td>
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<td>Be responsible</td>
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<td>Be loving</td>
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As the knower heeds these inherent norms, objectivity results. Objectivity, for Lonergan, is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Thus, Lonergan transcends the subject/object split of Burrell and Morgan. Burrell and Morgan point out:

Organisation theorists frequently treat the existence of organisations in a hard, concrete sense as taken for granted. They assume there are real phenomena which can be measured through the nomothetic methods which dominate empirical research in this area. From their point of view, our journey into phenomenology . . . may seem a journey into the absurd and extreme. However, having made that journey, the position adopted by highly objectivist social scientists appears equally absurd and extreme.

Lonergan provides the critical grounding in the operations of consciousness for both realist and phenomenological approaches to organizational analysis. This critical

grounding strengthens both approaches and helps scholars see that the two approaches need not be mutually exclusive, viewing one another as absurd and extreme, but instead, when done authentically, can complement one another.

THE ‘FLATLAND’ STATE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

With this chasm bridged, we are still faced with another problem in the spirituality and business conversation, the ‘flatland’ state of the social sciences. Such disparate thinkers as Richard Bernstein,27 Jurgen Habermas,28 Charles Taylor,29 and Alan Wallace,30 all address the limitations of contemporary social science which focuses solely on ‘what is’, taking into account only sensible data.

Habermas, for example, in *On the Logic of the Social Sciences*, argues that while the natural sciences and the humanities are ‘capable of living in a mutually indifferent, albeit more hostile than peaceful coexistence’,31 the social sciences are caught in the middle between the two. The

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27 Bernstein, *The restructuring of social and political theory*.
28 Habermas, *On the logic of the social sciences*.
29 Taylor, *Sources of the self*; idem, *The ethics of authenticity*.
30 Wallace, *The taboo of subjectivity*.
31 Habermas, *On the logic of the social sciences*, 3.
social sciences, he says, must ‘bear the tension of divergent approaches under one roof’,\textsuperscript{32} and, more often than not, opt for ‘a general and, in principle, unified empirical-analytic behavioral science, not different in structure from the theoretical natural sciences [which, they believe] can be produced from the purified corpus of the traditional social sciences’.\textsuperscript{33}

Bernstein, following this same train of thought, criticizes this ‘objectivism’:

‘Objectivism’ is a substantive orientation that believes that in the final analysis there is a realm of basic, uninterpreted, hard facts that serves as the foundation for all empirical knowledge. The appeal to these ‘facts’ presumably legitimizes empirical claims about the world. ‘Objectivism’ – a doctrine which in its primitive or sophisticated forms is shared by many mainstream social scientists – turns out to coincide with the ‘myth of

\textsuperscript{32} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{33} Idem, 2 (emphasis in original).
the given’ which has been so devastatingly criticized by contemporary philosophers.34

Alan Wallace comes at the same issue from a different angle:

While science has enthralled first Euro-American society and now most of the world with its progress in illuminating the nature of the external, physical world, I shall argue that it has eclipsed earlier knowledge of the nature of the inner reality of consciousness. In this regard, we in the modern West are unknowingly living in a dark age. A central aim of this book is to unveil the ideological constraints that have long been impeding scientific research in the study of consciousness and other subjective mental states.35
WHAT IS SCIENCE?

Among other things, these thinkers are all raising an important question, namely, ‘What is science?’ Let’s consider more closely the view of Robert Giacalone and Carol Jurkewicz, the management scholars whose point of view opened this article:

To have confidence that our suppositions are more than personal assumptions requires the dispassionate objectivism afforded by the scientific method. [...] Organizations need conclusive evidence connecting workplace spirituality with bottom line performance; anything less would bring into question their fiduciary responsibility to stockholders and their moral responsibility to stakeholders. For workplace spirituality to be a viable construct in improving organizations and the people in them, it requires a degree of confidence we can only attain through scientific measurement.36

This point of view is common in organizational studies. It represents the view of social science being critiqued above, a view that understands the social sciences’ validity as depending upon their identification with the physical sciences. It has a very specific definition of physical science in mind, namely, the rigorous study of sensible, measurable data, and thus a very specific definition of social science, the rigorous study of sensible, measurable data about humans. However, as we have just glimpsed, this approach to the social sciences is problematic, and when spirituality is added to the mix, the problems increase.

With these problems in mind, let’s turn to Daniel Helminiak, who addresses this knotty question from a Lonerganian perspective, and, in my view, sorts out the problems that management scholars studying spirituality face.

Helminiak acknowledges that what is generally known as ‘science’, ‘the rigorous study of the sensible, the measurable, the publically accessible’,\textsuperscript{37} is appropriate for the physical sciences and biology and at times is appropriate for the social sciences. Helminiak admires the scientific
method and, building on Lonergan, seeks to generalize it beyond merely the data of sense to include the data of consciousness. He claims:

To give an explanatory account of things is the essence of science. To determine what is happening or how something occurs, actually to explain a given phenomenon, is the goal of science. [...] So physics and chemistry attempt to account for the movement of planets or the emergence of stars or the nature of matter. Biology discerns the processes and mechanisms common to all living things. [...] The essence of science is to explain by appeal to appropriate evidence. ‘Science’ is usually taken to mean study of sensible data that are publicly available. [...] But this narrow understanding of science imposes a major restriction. It allows that only knowledge of what is sensible, physical, and measurable in some way can be science. It gratuitously rules out of court any evidence that is not of this particular kind, and in the process rules

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37 Helminiak, Religion and the human sciences, 61.
out of consideration any realities that are not of this kind. The suggestion here is that physical science is but one example [...] of science and that the essence of physical science is its achievement of methodically cumulative explanation. But if such explanation could be achieved in other realms beyond the physical, by appeal to appropriate evidence, and implementation of appropriate methodologies, that explanation would also qualify as science in those other realms. This deeper understanding of science, open to broader application, is the one adopted in this book.38

Helminiak goes on to explain that, in addition to the data of sense there are the data of consciousness, and that these data of consciousness ‘constitute legitimate evidence about mental – that is, psychic and spiritual – reality’.39 He claims that the challenge for a science of the spiritual is to

38 Idem 62-64.
39 Idem, 64.
become methodical and cumulative and thus to achieve real explanation’. 40

HELMINIAK’S HIGHER VIEWPOINTS

In order to develop a science of the spiritual, Helminiak proposes a nested hierarchy of four ‘viewpoints’, each of which transcends and includes the one below it. While contemporary social science focuses on ‘what is’, Helminiak claims that there is also a place for a social science which concerns itself with ‘what could be’, i.e., with who humans are at their best. For the purposes of the issues addressed in this article, Helminiak’s first two ‘viewpoints’ are most relevant. The first viewpoint, the ‘positivist’, describes ‘what is’. Both the ‘functionalist’ and the ‘interpretive’ paradigms of Burrell and Morgan fall within this viewpoint as do the empirical approaches critiqued by Habermas, Bernstein, and Wallace, and thus both the quantitative researchers and the phenomenologists, whose debate opened this talk, fall within this viewpoint (note this somewhat different use of the term ‘positivist’ from Burrell

40 Ibidem.
and Morgan’s). Helminiak does not disparage the positivist viewpoint, on the contrary he affirms it for what it contributes.

At the same time, Helminiak believes that the positivist viewpoint leaves important questions unaddressed. To address these questions, he builds on Lonergan and introduces the ‘philososophic’ viewpoint:

The philosopher is the seeker of wisdom, committed to the true, the good, and the beautiful. So concern for things human in terms of whether they are true or false and good or evil is called ‘philosophic’.

Another way of speaking about philosophic concern is to speak of authenticity. For Lonergan, authenticity implies ongoing personal commitment to openness, questioning, honesty, and good will across the board. In this sense, commitment to authenticity is exactly what characterizes the philosophic viewpoint.41

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By introducing the philosophic viewpoint, Helminiak is seeking to make the social sciences deeper and richer. This viewpoint is particularly important for the study of spirituality at work. The dimension added by the philosophic viewpoint allows discussion of the true and the good. It also allows discussion of spiritual development and its normative unfolding. Thus, through building on Lonergan, SAW study can focus on distinguishing between authentic and inauthentic spiritual development, both in individuals and in organizations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SAW RESEARCH

What, then, are the implications for SAW research, of using Lonergan’s work?

First, as we have seen, Lonergan’s transcending the subjective-objective divide allows both the realist empirical and the phenomenological approaches to stand on their own terms, each critically grounded, complementing one another. This allows for both quantitative and qualitative research, moving beyond Burrell and Morgan’s claim that the two are incommensurable. While other scholars have
argued that the two approaches can complement one another,\textsuperscript{42} no one to date has provided the philosophical foundation for that claim which I believe Lonergan provides. By honoring subjectivity and demonstrating how objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, Lonergan bridges the divide between the realist empirical and the phenomenological approaches. This philosophical foundation contributes to more solidly integrating qualitative methodologies into the toolset of spirituality in organizations research, so that the qualitative approach no longer needs to be a ‘satellite’ paradigm to the dominant quantitative paradigm.

Second, focusing on Lonergan’s concept of ‘further relevant questions’ opens the way for appropriate research methods to emerge as fit the research questions. For example, action research might be one appropriate method for SAW research. Action research’s emphasis not only on understanding, but also on making organizations better places for employees and for the world they inhabit fits well with many SAW scholars’ goals, and with Helminiak’s

\textsuperscript{42} See, for example, K.W. Parry, ‘Grounded theory and social process: A new direction for leadership research’, in: \textit{Leadership Quarterly} 9 (1998) no.1, 85-105: esp. 87-88; and T.
‘philosophic’ viewpoint, which focuses on the good and the true.

Third, building on Lonergan’s understanding of authenticity, SAW research might focus on discerning authenticity in the workplace, in both individuals and organizations. Mary Frohlich points out how, in the study of spirituality, scholars examine how their object of study both engages human persons radically and how it might also, e.g., in the case of a cult, pervert the depth potential of human persons. Such is also the case in studying spirituality at work. We discern how a particular object of study, for example, the spirituality lived out in the workplace at Southwest Airlines, both engages employees radically (and thus attracts some individuals to total commitment) and at the same time, might have the capacity to actually pervert the depth-potential of employees. Here SAW scholars might adopt methods from Critical Management Studies. For example, are the interests of owners and employees fundamentally at odds? Are there ways in which buying wholeheartedly into the vision articulated by the owners of

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Southwest Airlines might not be in employees’ best interests? By discerning authenticity and inauthenticity as they manifest themselves in the spirituality in the workplace phenomenon, we can begin to sort out the wheat from the chaff. In so doing, we can help CEOs, managers, and employees know when to welcome spirituality into their organizations in constructive and respectful ways, and when to reject inauthentic formulations of spirituality in the workplace.

It is important to stress that these different research methods will often overlap, will complement one another, and will support one another, even in the same study. As Thomas Lee\textsuperscript{44} points out in \textit{Using Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research}, we should ‘count the countable’. We will also seek to investigate those aspects of our subject that aren’t countable, using ethnomethodological tools, narrative, and various other qualitative techniques. Furthermore, we will ferret out inauthenticity and promote authenticity.

The field of spirituality at work desperately needs appropriate research methods if it is to be taken seriously in
the academy and if it is to contribute constructively to organizational practice. Drawing on Lonergan’s work can help provide a foundation for expanding its toolset and for thinking more clearly about which tools are most appropriate for which questions.

REFERENCES


Lee, Using qualitative methods in organizational research.


